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INTRODUCTION 
The recent sexual abuse scandal in the Catholic Church has put 
the enforceability of confidentiality agreements in settlement under 
the microscope.1  For years, the Church used confidential settlements 
to silence abuse victims.2  Although these agreements protected the 
identity of the victim, they also concealed the identities of the priests 
who often continued to serve at their parishes or other ministries.3  
For example, in 1997, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany paid a 
confidential settlement of just under one million dollars to a man 
who alleged that “he had been sexually abused for six years” by a 
priest “who regularly plied him with drugs and alcohol.”4  The 
settlement fell just below the diocese’s one million dollar ceiling; 
above that amount it must seek the consent of its finance counsel, an 
eight-member board composed of the diocesan bishop and seven lay 
people, designed to provide accountability for the diocese’s 
decisions.5  Thus, the settlement was entirely insulated from any 
public scrutiny, allowing the abusive priest to remain anonymous and 
perhaps continue in his position.6 
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 1 See Laurie Goodstein, Albany Diocese Settled Abuse Case for Almost $1Million, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 27, 2002, at B1.  The archdioce’s alleged failure to report instances of 
sexual abuse involving former priest John Geoghan acted as a catalyst as much as any 
other single event for national debate on sexual abuse involving priests.  Ralph 
Ranalli, Judge at Center of Geoghan Case Considered a ‘Fresh-Air Person,’ BOSTON GLOBE, 
May 8, 2002, at A17.  Approximately 300 lawsuits have been filed nationwide alleging 
sexual abuse by church officials.  Fred Bayles, Abuse Victims Flock to Lawyers, USA 
TODAY, July 31, 2002, at 1D. 
 2 Goodstein, supra note 1. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 See United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Charter for the Protection of 
Children and Young People Revised Edition, Preamble, available at 
 846 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:845 
Recently, however, as the sexual abuse scandal in the Catholic 
Church has escalated in the media, there has been a public call for 
accountability.7  A recent survey found that “at least 850 U.S. priests 
have been accused of sexual misconduct with minors since the early 
1960’s.”8  Because most victims signed confidentiality agreements, the 
Church has never had to disclose either the number of settlements or 
their cost.9  Financial experts, however, estimate that settlements have 
cost the Church between four hundred million to one billion dollars 
over the past two decades.10 
At least two courts have begun to question the propriety of 
enforcing confidential settlements involving sexual abuse by priests.11  
 
http://www.usccb.org/bishops/charter.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003) [hereinafter 
Charter] (“In the past, secrecy has created an atmosphere that has inhibited the 
healing process and, in some cases, enabled sexually abusive behavior to be 
repeated.”); see also Ranalli, supra note 1 (discussing eighty-four lawsuits pending 
against former priest John Geoghan). 
 7 See Walter V. Robinson, Crisis in the Church/Judicial Criticism; Conn. Courts Helped 
Hide Abuse, Judge Says, BOSTON GLOBE, June 14, 2002, at A1.  The United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops recently adopted national standards addressing 
sexual abuse of minors by priests.  See generally Charter, supra note 6.  See also Diocese 
Settles Sex Abuse Claims by Paying $880,000 in Camden, N.Y. TIMES, March 14, 2003, at 
B7; Iver Peterson, Bishops Agree to New Rules on Reporting of Sex Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
3, 2002, at B5.  Article 3 of the Charter provides that “Diocese/eparchies will not 
enter into confidentiality agreements except for grave and substantial reasons 
brought forward by the victim/survivor and noted in the text of the agreement.”  
Charter, supra note 6, at Article 3. 
 8 Cathy Lynn Grossman, Advocates Withdraw from Suit vs. Bishops, USA TODAY, 
June 10, 2002, at 3A. 
 9 Goodstein, supra note 1 (stating that confidential settlements have been the 
norm in sexual abuse cases for years).  Settlements under one million dollars did not 
go before the Dioceses’ finance counsels, thus, insulating the settlement and its 
amount from disclosure.  See Goodstein, supra note 1. 
 10 Gary Strauss, What Happens if There’s a Lot Less in the Plate?, USA TODAY, Aug. 1, 
2002, at 8D.  Generally, if a confidentiality agreement is broken, the victim or the 
victim’s family forfeits a substantial portion of the settlement.  See Goodstein, supra 
note 1.  Recently, however, many victims and lawyers have broken confidentiality 
agreements with little fear of repercussions due to a current climate that is sharply 
critical of the Catholic Church’s alleged cover-up.  Id.; see also Adam Liptak, Price of 
Broken Vows of Silence, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2002, § 1 at 20 (stating that many victims 
have broken confidentiality agreements and have not been sued).  Also, many victims 
have filed class-action lawsuits against the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops and 
dioceses to void confidentiality agreements.  Grossman, supra note 8. 
 11 See, e.g., In re Application of the New York Times for Vacating Sealing Orders, 
Vacating Protective Orders and Requiring Filing of Discovery Materials, No. 
X06CV020170932S, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1634, at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 8, 
2002) (unsealing documents in twenty-three cases involving sexual abuse of minors 
by priests based on clear public interest in disclosure) [hereinafter In re New York 
Times]; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Clerk of Suffolk County Super. Ct., No. 01-5588-F, 
2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS 6, at *30-32 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2002) (terminating 
impoundment of confidential documents involving clergy sexual abuse based on 
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In a recent unpublished opinion, Connecticut Superior Court Judge 
Robert F. McWeeny accused the Connecticut judiciary of complicity 
in the Diocese of Bridgeport’s efforts to cover up the extent of clergy 
sexual abuse.12  Judge McWeeny, who ordered that seven boxes of 
documents containing information regarding confidential settlement 
of sexual abuse cases be unsealed,13 criticized what he called “a 
judicial model of cooperation with the Diocese in endlessly delaying 
litigation, sealing files and coercing victims into non-disclosure 
settlements.”14  Judge McWeeny added that the Connecticut Appellate 
Court’s decision to delay release of the documents on the basis of an 
appeal by the diocese was “elevating institutional interests in covering 
up a scandal over the legitimate public interest in the issue of the 
Church’s response to sexual abuse of minors by priests.”15  Judge 
McWeeny then asked if “it [can] seriously be maintained that secrecy 
at all costs was a wise or effective policy?”16 
The alleged Catholic Church cover-up is only one example of 
the danger of routine enforcement of confidential settlement 
contracts without any consideration of the public’s best interests.  
Although courts generally will not interfere with parties’ freedom to 
contract as they see fit,17 in limited instances, courts have withheld 
enforcement in the name of public policy.18  Increasingly, however, 
 
public interest and the First Amendment); Ranalli, supra note 1 (discussing Judge 
Constance M. Sweeney’s decision to order the release of thousands of documents 
from sexual abuse suits against former priest John Geoghan). 
 12 Robinson, supra note 7; see also In re New York Times, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
1634, at *11 (unsealing documents involving clergy sexual abuse). 
 13 See In re New York Times, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1634, at *11. 
 14 See Robinson, supra note 7. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 See, e.g., Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587, 610-11 (1936) (stating that 
“[f]reedom of contract is the general rule and restraint the exception”).  But see also 
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 392-93 (1937) (holding that freedom of 
contract is not an absolute right and it may be restricted when in the public interest); 
Juliet P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern Contract 
Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115, 116-18 (1988) (discussing the public policy exception as 
a “rare limitation on the freedom of contract”). 
 18 See, e.g., Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 880-81 (Ill. 1981) 
(allowing a claim for retaliatory discharge because public policy favors reporting 
criminal offenses); Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Wash. Nat’l Arena, 
386 A.2d 1216, 1228 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) (stating that judges should not be 
“restricted to the conventional sources of positive law (constitutions, statutes and 
judicial decisions)” and “are frequently called upon to discern the dictates of sound 
social policy and human welfare based on nothing more than their own personal 
experience and intellectual capacity”); Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Ed., 542 N.E.2d 663 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to enforce a confidentiality agreement protecting 
teacher’s pedophilia).  See generally Walter Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 
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courts have become reluctant to interfere with contracts or to craft 
broad social policy in the absence of a clear, legislative articulation of 
the policies at stake.19 
This Comment suggests that courts should adopt a more active 
role in shaping public policy by refusing to honor confidentiality 
agreements that threaten public safety, even in the absence of an 
authoritative legislative declaration.  Part I examines the recent case 
Giannecchini v. Hospital of St. Raphael,20 which suggests a useful judicial 
approach for evaluating non-disclosure contracts.21  Part II briefly 
discusses the evolution of the public policy exception to contract 
enforcement.  Part III considers the balancing approach of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (the “Second Restatement”), 
which provides guidelines for determining whether a non-disclosure 
provision is contrary to public policy.22  Part IV examines the 
employment-at-will doctrine, an area in which courts have taken a 
more active approach and carved out a public policy exception.23  
 
COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1935) (arguing that the modern statutory regime forces judges 
to act as mere arbiters of statutory law rather than framers of public policy).  See also 
infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
179 cmt. a, b (1981) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].  Historically, judges defined public 
policy based on their own perception of protecting public welfare.  See RESTATEMENT 
§ 179 cmt. a.  Some important policies developed by judges over centuries, include 
“the policies against restraint of trade, impairment of domestic relations, and 
interference with duties owed to individuals.”  Id.  Today, public policy is generally 
defined by the legislature, in part, because it is equipped with superior resources to 
conduct investigations of the public interest.  See RESTATEMENT § 179 cmt. b.  
Legislators, however, are often unaware of the contract law problems that may arise 
in connection with legislation.  Id. 
 19 See, e.g., Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66-67 (1945) (declining to 
invalidate government eminent domain contracts based merely on the gross disparity 
between the original cost of the property and the government’s purchase price 
because Congress did not pass legislation allowing private citizens greater recovery); 
Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 87 (N.Y. 1983) (declining to 
recognize a claim for wrongful discharge because the legislature had not yet done 
so).  See also RESTATEMENT §179 cmt. b (explaining that judges today must carefully 
examine the relevant legislative scheme and legislative history in order to guide their 
decisions on public policy). 
 20 780 A.2d 1006 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002) (holding a hospital liable for breaching 
a non-disclosure contract that protected a nurse’s personnel records after carefully 
considering the incidental effects enforcement could have on public health and 
safety); see also supra PART I (discussing Giannecchini v. Hospital of St. Raphael). 
 21 Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 154-61. 
 22 RESTATEMENT § 178 (articulating a balancing test for determining whether to 
enforce a contract). 
 23 See, e.g., Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 880-81 (holding that a claim for retaliatory 
discharge existed because public policy favors reporting criminal offenses); 
Peterman v. Int’l Bd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27-28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) 
(recognizing non-statutory wrongful discharge claim).  See also EMPLOYMENT LAW, 
PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES 265 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 2d ed. vol. 2 1999) 
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Part V then considers more specifically the whistleblowing exception 
to the employment-at-will doctrine, especially where confidentiality 
agreements are at issue.24  This area is a particularly useful analog 
because courts must balance the public’s interest in disclosure and 
the private contractual interests in secrecy. 
Finally, Part VI of this Comment suggests a new approach for 
evaluating non-disclosure agreements that threaten the public 
welfare.  As the Second Restatement suggests, courts should first 
reference the relevant statutory provisions as guideposts.25  Second, 
courts should determine whether, in light of the statutory scheme, 
the legislature has explicitly contemplated the policy questions before 
them.  This analysis should roughly mirror federal preemption 
analysis.26  Essentially, the courts should determine whether the 
relevant statutory scheme effectively “preempts” an independent, 
discretionary decision.27  In the absence of such “preemption,” courts 
should then perform the Second Restatement balancing test, 
weighing the potential adverse third-party effects of enforcement 
against an individual’s rights to privacy and freedom of contract.28  
Courts should focus on whether the agreement creates a substantial 
health or safety danger outweighing enforcement.29  This approach 
provides a framework for guided judicial activism, emphasizing a 
judge’s duty to consider the best interests of the public before 
enforcing a confidential settlement contract. 
 
 
 
[hereinafter Rothstein] (discussing the erosion of the employment at will doctrine). 
 24 Rothstein, supra note 23, §§ 8.9, 8.11. 
 25 RESTATEMENT § 179 cmt. b (1981). 
 26 Under federal preemption analysis, courts determine whether a scheme of 
federal regulation displaces a state constitutional or statutory remedy.  See Pacific Gas 
& Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conserv. & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983) 
(describing the three categories of federal preemption analysis); 
see also Candice S. Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. 
Rev. 687, 699-700 (1991) (describing federal preemption analysis). 
 27 See infra Part VI (discussing preemption as a model); see also RESTATEMENT § 
178 cmt. a. (explaining that if legislation is found to be valid and applicable, courts 
must follow its legislative mandate). 
 28 RESTATEMENT § 178; see also Stewart J. Schwab, Searching for Public Policy: The 
Misguided Demand for Statutory Violations, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1957-58 (1996) 
(arguing that courts should focus on the potential adverse third-party effects of 
enforcement). 
 29 Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable?, 25 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 672 (1999) (asserting that public health and safety is 
perhaps the most important in the hierarchy of public policies). 
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I.  GIANNECCHINI V. HOSPITAL OF ST. RAPHAEL: STATUTORY ANALYSIS 
AND NON-DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS 
Michael Giannecchini worked as a nurse at the Hospital of St. 
Raphael (the “Hospital”) in New Haven, Connecticut from early 1992 
through March of 1993, when the Hospital terminated his 
employment.30  In memorializing Giannecchini’s dismissal, the 
Hospital’s director of personnel (the “Director”) executed a 
document containing a “Remarks” section evaluating Giannecchini’s 
job performance.31  The document rated Giannecchini as “‘Average’ 
with respect to ‘Attitude’, ‘Personality’ and ‘Attendance’ and ‘Below 
Average’ with respect to ‘Ability’ and ‘Industry.’”32  Most significantly, 
the document also indicated that Giannecchini had committed 
“[s]everal serious medication errors.”33 
Upon dismissal, Giannecchini immediately obtained an attorney 
who successfully negotiated a non-disclosure agreement.34  The 
agreement provided that future employers could not obtain the 
information contained in the Director’s personnel evaluation.35  
Thus, the “Settlement Agreement and Release” essentially expunged 
all references to Giannecchini’s termination and the reasons for such 
dismissal.36  In addition, Giannecchini retained the right to sue for 
breach of contract should the Hospital disseminate his personnel file 
without permission.37 
Giannecchini then applied for a position with the Department of 
Veterans’ Affairs Hospital (the “VA”) in West Haven and listed the 
Hospital as a former employer.38  As part of its standard application 
process, the VA required Giannecchini to sign an “Authorization for 
Release of Information,” allowing the VA to inquire into the 
applicant’s educational background and professional qualifications.39  
 
 30 Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1006. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id.  Non-disclosure agreements, also known as confidentiality agreements, are 
“instrument[s] to protect and preserve trade secrets and other valuable confidential 
information.  Such agreements typically arise in employment relationships.”  See 2 
MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 13:3 (2002); see also Terry Morehead Dworkin 
& Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Buying Silence, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 151, 152-54 (1998) 
(discussing the increasing use of secrecy clauses). 
 35 Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1009. 
 36 Furthermore, in requests from inquiring employers, the Hospital’s disclosures 
were limited to dates of service, title, position, and salary information.  Id. 
 37 Id. at 1009. 
 38 Id. at 1010. 
 39 Id. 
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The release also shielded from liability all those who provided 
information.40 
The VA then sent the Hospital a letter requesting information 
and attached a copy of the authorization.41  In response, the Director 
released Giannecchini’s personnel file, including the negative 
information contained in the “Remarks” section of the termination 
document.42  As a result of the Director’s disclosures, the VA did not 
hire Giannecchini.43 
Giannecchini commenced an action against the Hospital for 
breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith, and 
defamation.44  At summary judgment, the court found for 
Giannecchini on the breach of contract claim, holding the Hospital 
liable for the Director’s unauthorized disclosures, and found in favor 
of the Hospital as to the other counts.45  The court was satisfied that 
 
 40 Id. at 1011.  The release provided: 
In order for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to assess and 
verify my educational background, professional qualifications and 
suitability for employment, I: 
Authorize the VA to make inquiries concerning such 
information about me to my previous employer(s), current 
employer, educational institutions, State licensing boards, 
professional liability insurance carriers, other professional 
organizations and/or persons, agencies, organizations or 
institutions listed by me as references, and to any other 
appropriate sources to whom the VA may be referred by those 
contacted or deemed appropriate; 
Authorize release of such information and copies of related 
records and/or documents to VA officials; “Release from 
liability all those who provide information to the VA in good 
faith and without malice in response to such inquiries; and 
Authorize the VA to disclose to such persons, employers, 
institutions, boards or agencies identifying and other 
information about me to enable the VA to make such inquiries. 
Id. 
 41 Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1011. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 1009-10. 
 45 Id. at 1013-16.  The non-disclosure agreement provided that, “Any and all 
references in said file(s) to an involuntary termination of the employment of 
Giannecchini will be expunged.”  Id. at 1013.  The Hospital had plainly agreed to 
“remove” any information related to involuntary termination from Giannecchini’s 
personnel file under § 31-128e.  Id.  (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-128e (2001).  
Thus, the court held that Giannecchini was statutorily permitted to assume that the 
Hospital had already removed this information when he signed the authorization 
and the Hospital’s unauthorized disclosures constituted a breach of the non-
disclosure contract.  Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1013-16.  The court stated: 
the “authorization” must be read with Giannecchini’s legitimate 
expectations—expectations legitimized by the provisions of positive 
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the legislature intended that this type of non-disclosure provision 
should be enforced as part of a “comprehensive legislative scheme . . . 
dealing with the integrity and disclosure of employee personnel files” 
and based its ruling on two statutory provisions.46 
Setting the issue of the authorization aside,47 the court 
considered whether the Hospital had breached the non-disclosure 
agreement.48  The court, however, first examined Connecticut 
General Statute Sections 31-128e49 and 31-128f50 to determine 
 
law—in mind. In light of both the contract he had signed and the 
provisions of §§ 31-128e and 31-128f, Giannecchini could legitimately 
expect that references to his involuntary termination would no longer 
be contained in his file.  We now know, of course, that this was not the 
case, but when he signed the “authorization” he had no way of knowing 
this.  He was not the party maintaining the file.  He had the right both 
contractual and statutory—to count on the hospital keeping its word.  
For this reason, his “authorization” did not authorize the disclosure of 
references to his involuntary termination. 
Id. at 1014.  The court noted, however, that numerous unflattering references to 
Giannecchini’s ability and industry were outside the ambit of paragraph 2 of the 
agreement, and were instead controlled by paragraph 3.  Id.  Although this 
information was presumptively confidential, it was still “contained” in the personnel 
file under § 31-128e.  Id. (discussing § 31-128e).  Thus, the Hospital was permitted to 
disclose this information under the authorization.  Id. 
 46 Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1011 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-128e, f (2001)). 
 47 Id. at 1010; see also supra note 45 (discussing the effect of the authorization). 
 48 Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1010. 
 49 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-128e (2001).  The statute states the following: 
If upon inspection of his personnel file or medical records an 
employee disagrees with any of the information contained in such file 
or records, removal or correction of such information may be agreed 
upon by such employee and his employer.  If such employee and 
employer cannot agree upon such removal or correction then such 
employee may submit a written statement explaining his position.  
Such statement shall be maintained as part of such employee’s 
personnel file or medical records and shall accompany any transmittal 
or disclosure from such file or records made to a third party. 
Id. 
 50 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-128f (2001).  The statute states that as follows: 
No individually identifiable information contained in the personnel 
file or medical records of any employee shall be disclosed by an 
employer to any person or entity not employed by or affiliated with the 
employer without the written authorization of such employee except 
where the information is limited to the verification of dates of 
employment and the employee’s title or position and wage or salary or 
where the disclosure is made: (1) To a third party that maintains or 
prepares employment records or performs other employment-related 
services for the employer; (2) pursuant to a lawfully issued 
administrative summons or judicial order, including a search warrant 
or subpoena, or in response to a government audit or the investigation 
or defense of personnel-related complaints against the employer; (3) 
pursuant to a request by a law enforcement agency for an employee’s 
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whether the agreement could be enforced consistent with public 
policy.51  Section 31-128e provides that an employer and employee 
may agree to remove or correct any disputed information in a 
personnel file and, in the event that an agreement cannot be 
reached, the employee may submit a written explanation that must be 
attached to the file.52  Generally, Section 31-128f provides that, absent 
the written authorization of the employee, employers should not 
disclose information from a personnel file other than verification of 
dates of employment, title, and wage or salary.53  After hearing 
arguments from both sides, the court determined that the 
Connecticut legislature had explicitly considered all issues regarding 
disclosure of employee personnel records.54  Thus, the court held that 
the Hospital had breached its agreement with Mr. Giannecchini.55 
Significantly, the court articulated a broader concern regarding 
the societal impact of this type of non-disclosure agreement.56  The 
court was concerned that potential patients were unrepresented at 
the bargaining table when the agreement was executed.  The court 
emphasized that patients are utterly dependent on the competence 
of healthcare professionals.57  Although this type of non-disclosure 
agreement may expeditiously resolve a conflict between the 
contracting parties, it also exposes society to significant risks, such as 
treatment by incompetent healthcare professionals.58 
The court’s analysis illustrates the proper role that public policy 
and legislation should play when courts evaluate non-disclosure 
contracts.  Rather than mechanically enforcing the contract, the 
 
home address and dates of his attendance at work; (4) in response to 
an apparent medical emergency or to apprise the employee’s physician 
of a medical condition of which the employee may not be aware; (5) to 
comply with federal, state or local laws or regulations; or (6) where the 
information is disseminated pursuant to the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement.  Where such authorization involves medical 
records the employer shall inform the concerned employee of his or 
his physician’s right of inspection and correction, his right to withhold 
authorization, and the effect of any withholding of such authorization 
upon such employee. 
Id. 
 51 §§ 31-128e, f. 
 52 § 31-128e. 
 53 § 31-128f. 
 54 Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1011. 
 55 Id. at 1014. 
 56 Id. at 1010. 
 57 Id. 
 58 See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 34, at 171-91 (discussing the public policy 
dangers of routinely enforcing confidentiality agreements). 
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court recognized the adverse impact that enforcement could have on 
public welfare and referenced the relevant statutory provisions for 
guidance.59  Essentially, the question that the Giannecchini court 
considered, and other courts should consider, is whether non-
disclosure agreements can be enforced consistent with public policy, 
particularly when they implicate public health and safety.60 
II.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION: THE DECLINE 
OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN SHAPING PUBLIC POLICY 
As an early English court observed, public policy “is a very unruly 
horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will 
carry you.”61  The judicial conception of public policy has proved an 
amorphous, ever-changing concept, characterized by uncertainty and 
unpredictability.62 
The power to invalidate contracts based on public policy can be 
traced to the English common-law.63  For many years, the judiciary 
was the embodiment of the public conscience and, as such, dictated 
the contours of public policy.64  The birth of the modern regulatory 
regime, however, altered the public policy landscape.65  In this new 
regime, the legislature has replaced the judiciary as “the authoritative 
denouncer of conduct” because it possesses superior resources with 
which to discern the prevailing mores of society.66  The legislature, 
 
 59 Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1011. 
 60 Id. at 1010 (“[I]s judicial enforcement of . . . the . . . agreement . . . consistent 
with public policy?”). 
 61 Richardson v. Mellish, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824) (quoted in Giannecchini, 
780 A.2d at 1010). 
 62 1 W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 675 (5th ed. 1874).  For a 
more detailed discussion of the public policy doctrine, see generally Gellhorn, supra 
note 18; John Shand, Unblinkering the Unruly Horse: Public Policy in the Law of Contract, 
30 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 144 (1972); George A. Strong, The Enforceability of Illegal Contracts, 
11 HASTINGS L.J. 347 (1961). 
 63 See Wildey v. Collier, 7 Md. 273, 278-79 (Md. 1854) (holding that when there is 
a conflict between private contractual rights and public policy, the public policy is 
paramount); see also Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Wash. Nat’l 
Arena, 386 A.2d 1216, 1228 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) (“From the dawn of the 
common law tradition in England, courts have refused to implement those private 
contractual undertakings which, when measured against the prevailing mores and 
moods of society, contravene judicial perceptions of so-called ‘public policy.’”) 
(citing 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A COMMENTARY UPON 
LITTLETON 19 (Thomas ed. 1827)); Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 679 (discussing the 
public policy exception at English common-law); Percy H. Winfield, Public Policy in 
the English Common Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 76, 79 (1928). 
 64 Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 679; see also RESTATEMENT § 179 cmt. a, b. 
 65 Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 679. 
 66 Id. 
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however, often makes policy decisions with little understanding of 
possible contract law implications.67 
Walter Gellhorn argues that the modern statutory regime 
relegates judges to the role of interstitialists; that is, judges act merely 
to fill in gaps in statutory language rather than to craft broad social 
policy.68  Thus, statutes, not judicial decisions, have become the 
embodiment of the public conscience.69  Gellhorn asserts that the 
greatest problem with this dichotomous approach is that most judges 
choose to mechanically apply statutes, ignoring the reality that the 
legislature is often unaware of the effects such proclamations can 
have on contract law.70  As a result, public policy is confused further 
by counterintuitive results, or what Gellhorn calls “patent inanities.”71  
Gellhorn advocates instead that although statutes must be “the 
starting point of the judges’ excursion into territory uncharted,” 
courts should use statutes only as a factor when scrutinizing a 
 
 67 See RESTATEMENT § 179 cmt. b (“When proscribing conduct, however, 
legislators seldom address themselves explicitly to the problems of contract law that 
may arise in connection with such conduct.”); see also Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 684. 
 68 Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 684.  There is much debate regarding the role of 
judges as interpreters of the law.  See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION (1997).  In one of the most famous articulations of the limited role 
that judges should play in creating law, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote: 
I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but 
they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to 
molecular motions.  A common law judge could not say I think the 
doctrine of consideration a bit of historical nonsense and shall not 
enforce it in my court.  No more could a judge exercising the limited 
jurisdiction of admiralty say I think well of the common-law rules of 
master and servant and propose to introduce them here en bloc. 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920).  Justice Scalia 
advocates a philosophy of interpretation known as textualism.  SCALIA, supra, at 22-23.  
Textualism emphasizes that judges need not inquire into legislative intent; instead, 
they should merely determine what the statute means as written.  Id. at 23.  Justice 
Breyer, on the other hand, argues that courts should interpret statutes by inquiring 
into legislative intent.  See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in 
Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 848-61 (1992). 
 69 Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 684. 
 70 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT § 179 cmt. a. 
 71 See, e.g., Short v. Bullion-Beck & Champion Mining Co., 57 P. 720 (Utah 1899).  
In Short, the plaintiff worked twelve hour days and brought suit seeking to recover 
overtime pay.  Id. at 720.  The court held that the employee, despite working 
overtime at his employer’s request, was also guilty of violating a statute providing that 
a maximum of eight hours a day could be worked in institutions for reduction or 
refining of metal or ore.  Id. at 721.  Although it seems obvious that the statute was 
intended to protect employees from abuses by their employer, the court held that 
the employee was not entitled to the overtime pay because the contract for the 
overtime hours contravened public policy as manifested by the statute.  Id. at 723; see 
also Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 688. 
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contract that may violate public policy.72 
A few courts have assumed an even more active approach, 
invalidating contracts in the absence of explicit statutory guidance.73  
For example, in Bowman  v. Parma Board of Education,74 an Ohio Court 
of Appeals panel unequivocally refused to enforce an agreement 
precluding a school board from disclosing a teacher’s history of 
pedophilia to other school districts.75  The court stated that “the only 
possible conclusion under the circumstances of the instant case is 
that the non-disclosure clause is void and unenforceable and no 
cause of action will lie for its breach.”76  The Bowman court clearly 
exercised its own judgment in recognizing its duty to protect the 
interests of the public despite the absence of a clear legislative 
articulation of the policies at stake.77 
Many courts, however, often exercise restraint in the absence of 
legislative action.78  Cautious not to offend separation of powers 
principles, courts have cynically posited that “public policy . . . is but a 
shifting and variable notion appealed to only when no other 
argument is available, and which, if relied upon today, may be utterly 
repudiated tomorrow.”79  In fact, some courts have deliberately 
 
 72 Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 685. 
 73 See, e.g., Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 880-81 (Ill. 1981) 
(allowing a retaliatory discharge claim based on public policy); Md.-Nat’l, 386 A.2d at 
1228 (stating that judges should not be restricted to positive law when crafting public 
policy); Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Ed., 542 N.E.2d 663 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). 
 74 542 N.E.2d 663. 
 75 Id. at 666-67. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id.  Similarly, Connecticut Superior Court Judge McWeeny’s decision to order 
disclosure of the secret documents related to the Church’s alleged cover-up of 
rampant sexual abuse is motivated by a similar reluctance to allow behavior as 
extreme as sexual abuse of minors to be contractually shielded from public 
awareness.  See Robinson, supra note 7. 
 78 See, e.g., Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 87 (N.Y. 1983) 
(declining to recognize wrongful discharge in the absence of legislative declaration); 
Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. 1974) (disallowing a wrongful 
discharge action, and asserting the importance of legislative or statutory guidance). 
 79 Md.-Nat’l, 386 A.2d at 1228 (quoting Kenneweg v. Allegany County, 62 A. 249, 
251 (Md. 1905)).  The Md.-Nat’l court explained that Maryland courts have 
invalidated voluntary agreements on public policy grounds only sparingly, “[f]earing 
the disruptive effect that invocation of the highly elusive public policy principle 
would likely exert on the stability of commercial and contractual relations.”  Id.  
Maryland courts have only invoked public policy when the agreement was patently 
offensive to “the common sense of the entire community.”  Id. (citing Estate of 
Woods, Weeks & Co., 52 Md. 520, 536 (Md. 1879)); see also Trupp v. Wolf, 24 Md. 
App. 588, 616, cert. denied, 275 Md. 757 (1975).  The court explained that judicial 
reluctance to nullify voluntary contractual arrangements protects the clear public 
interest in allowing private parties to contract freely.  Md.-Nat’l, 386 A.2d at 1228-29 
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ignored policy considerations, choosing instead to adopt a policy of 
inaction in the absence of a clear legislative declaration.80  For 
instance, in Murphy v. American Home Products Corp.,81 the court 
declined to follow the modern trend toward recognizing a claim for 
wrongful discharge of an at-will employee and decided instead to wait 
for legislative action.82  Although the court recognized the tenuous 
situation of an at-will employee, it declined the invitation to act 
because, in the court’s opinion, it is the duty of the legislature to 
resolve public policy issues.83  The court reasoned that the legislature 
is ultimately in a better position to make a significant change in the 
law.84 
Unfortunately, although modern courts and legislatures have 
recognized that freedom of contract must sometimes yield to public 
policy, albeit in rare circumstances, it remains unclear when public 
policy actually suggests non-enforcement of certain contracts.85  The 
balancing approach of the Second Restatement attempts to provide 
judges with guidance in balancing public policy and contractual 
guarantees.86 
 
(citing RESTATEMENT, Introductory Note to Ch. 14, at 46 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1977)).  
Thus, the Md.-Nat’l court asserted that it is ultimately the court’s responsibility to 
balance public and private interests in certainty when executing a contract against 
those policies favoring non-enforcement.  Id. at 1229; see also Muschany v. United 
States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945) (“Public policy is to be ascertained by reference to the 
laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public 
interests.”) (citing Vidal v. Philadelphia, 43 U.S. 127, 197-98 (1844)). 
 80 See, e.g., Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 89; Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 
1974). 
 81 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983). 
 82 Id. at 87. 
 83 Id. at 89. 
 84 Id. at 89-90. 
 85 See, e.g., Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79 (acknowledging that public policy lacks 
a precise definition and asserting that public policy must be a matter that “strike[s] 
at the heart of a citizen’s social rights, duties, and responsibilities”); Geary, 319 A.2d 
at 180 (declining to define the parameters of at-will employment); see also Kostritsky, 
supra note 17, at 116-18 (discussing the public policy exception as “a rare limitation 
on the freedom of contract”).  Kostritsky suggests that courts should consider 
efficient deterrence as a method for deciding whether to invalidate contracts on 
grounds of public policy.  Kostritsky, supra note 17, at 121-22.  The efficient 
deterrence model suggests that the illegal contracts doctrine is wrongly rooted in 
public policy.  Id. at 117-21.  Instead, Kostritsky posits that “a graduated relief 
structure will maximize efficient deterrence—allocating the risk of nonenforcement to 
the cheapest cost avoider, rather than to both parties in all instances.”  Id. at 122.  
This system, Kostritsky urges, conserves judicial resources and reframes the illegal 
contracts doctrine to be compatible with traditional notions of autonomy and 
freedom of contract.  Id. at 163. 
 86 RESTATEMENT § 178. 
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III.  THE BALANCING APPROACH OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS 
The First Restatement of Contracts articulated the traditional 
rule regarding non-enforcement of a contract on grounds of public 
policy.87  The First Restatement stated that: “[a] party to an illegal 
bargain can neither recover damages for breach thereof, nor, by 
rescinding the bargain, recover the performance . . . thereunder or 
its value,” subject to various exceptions.88  The Second Restatement, 
however, shifts away from emphasizing “illegal” contracts and focuses 
instead on whether a contract is unenforceable as contrary to public 
policy.89  The Second Restatement adopts a balancing test aimed at 
guiding a judge’s determination as to whether a contract should be 
unenforceable as contrary to public policy.90  The drafters suggest 
that the courts “consider the importance of any policy as reflected in 
legislation or judicial decision.”91 
Section 178 of the Second Restatement indicates that in 
weighing the significance of the public policy, the court should 
consider the following factors: 1) the strength of the policy as 
embodied in legislation or decisions; 2) the likelihood that non-
enforcement will further the policy at stake; and 3) the seriousness of 
the misconduct at issue and its causal connection to the terms of the 
contract.92  Courts, however, should balance these considerations 
against traditional contract concerns such as preserving parties’ 
justified expectations, any forfeiture that may result, and the possible 
existence of a specific public interest favoring enforcement.93  Using 
these factors to guide and manage its discretion, the court should 
deny enforcement only if the public policy at stake “clearly 
outweigh[s]” the necessity of preserving the integrity of traditional 
contract law principles.94 
An analysis of Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning 
Commission v. Washington National Arena95 illustrates how the balancing 
approach of the Second Restatement should be applied.96  In Md.-
 
 87 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS (1932). 
 88 Id. § 598; see also 6 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 7 
(Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1995). 
 89 RESTATEMENT §§ 178, 179. 
 90 RESTATEMENT § 178. 
 91 WILLISTON, supra note 88, at 10 (discussing RESTATEMENT §§ 178, 179). 
 92 RESTATEMENT § 178. 
 93 Id.; see also WILLISTON, supra note 88, at 10. 
 94 RESTATEMENT §178 cmt. a, illus.1. 
 95 386 A.2d 1216 (Md. 1978). 
 96 Id. 
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Nat’l, a taxpayer agreed to waive his right to contest any 
determination by the Supervisor of Assessments concerning the 
taxability of a parcel of land.97  Despite the agreement, the taxpayer 
sued, arguing that any term contracting away an individual’s due 
process rights is contrary to public policy.98  In holding that the 
noncontestability clause was not void as against public policy, the 
Maryland Supreme Court balanced the public policy concerns 
favoring non-enforcement of the contract against the policies 
favoring enforcement.99  The court began by noting the “reluctance 
on the part of the judiciary to nullify contractual arrangements on 
public policy grounds” in order to protect the strong public interest 
in allowing individuals to structure their own relationships through 
contracts.100  The court then reasoned that the danger of enforcing a 
clause that deprives a party of his right to appeal a judgment did not 
“clearly and unequivocally outweigh the reasons for giving effect to 
the plain and unambiguous intention of the parties manifested by the 
language” of the provision.101 
Section 179 of the Second Restatement further clarifies the 
balancing test.102  A contract term should not be enforced if indicated 
in relevant legislation,103 or if the interests in enforcement are clearly 
outweighed by the public welfare.104  Although conceding that 
legislators do not typically act with contract enforcement in mind, the 
drafters rely on the notion that the legislature is in a better position 
 
 97 Id. at 1220. 
 98 Id. at 1221. 
 99 Id. at 1229. 
 100 Id. at 1228-29. 
 101 Md.-Nat’l, 386 A.2d at 1229. 
 102 RESTATEMENT § 179.  Entitled “Bases of Public Opinion,” this section 
enumerates the bases for carving out a public policy favoring non-enforcement.  Id. 
 103 Id. § 178 cmt. a.  The section states the following: 
The term “legislation” is used here in the broadest sense to include any 
fixed text enacted by a body with authority to promulgate rules, 
including not only statutes, but constitutions and local ordinances, as 
well as administrative regulations issued pursuant to them.  It also 
encompasses foreign laws to the extent they are applicable under 
conflict of law rules. 
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 202, 203 (1971)). 
 104 Id. § 179.  Section 179 elaborates three examples of well-established judicial 
policies that may weigh against enforcement of a contractual provision: restraint of 
trade, impairment of family relations, and interference with other protected 
interests.  Id. § 179 (b)(i), (ii), (iii).  According to the comments and illustrations, 
certain policies against enforcement were developed by judges on the basis of their 
own perception of the significance of protecting the public in certain instances.  Id. § 
179 cmt. a.  The examples listed in § 179(b) are “now rooted in precedents 
accumulated over centuries.”  Id. 
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than the judiciary to represent the public.105  The drafters clarify, 
however, that legislation should not be dispositive.106  Instead, the 
drafters urge that legislation should only be used to “enlighten 
[judges]. . . concerning the specific policy to which it is relevant.”107  
Thus, despite emphasizing the necessity of legislation, judicial 
discretion is preserved as a basis for non-enforcement of a 
contractual provision.108 
In sum, the Second Restatement framework emphasizes 
legislation as a judicial guidepost.109  It does not, however, completely 
displace a judge’s exercise of independent discretion in the absence 
of legislative guidance.  Despite the comments to Section 179, which 
clarify that legislation need not be controlling as to the disposition of 
the case, courts have been reluctant to assume an active role in 
defining public policy.110  Rather than using legislation as an aid in 
determining public policy, courts have typically declined to exercise 
any independent discretion in policy determinations.111  These courts 
have instead chosen to leave public policy determinations for 
resolution by the legislature.112  A notable exception to this judicial 
restraint is the active role that courts play in carving out exceptions in 
 
 105 RESTATEMENT § 179 cmt. b; see also G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE 
OF STATUTES 92-97 (1982), reprinted in RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: 
TEXT, MATERIALS, AND CASES, 175-80 (2d ed. 1996).  Judge Calabresi asserts that 
judges, as a result of the manner of their selection and lengthy terms, follow “longer-
run majoritarian sentiments than . . . congressmen.”  Id.  Further, judges are more 
likely to follow their own principles rather than being directly responsive to modern 
sentiments.  Id. at 176-77.  Judge Calabresi, however, does not go so far as to assert 
that judges are entirely immune from “majoritarian pressures.”  Id. at 177.  See 
generally ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS 
PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE (1953). 
 106 RESTATEMENT § 179 cmt. b. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. §179. 
 110 See, e.g., Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 87 (declining to recognize the tort of abusive or 
wrongful discharge of an at-will employee despite the modern trend towards 
recognition); Geary, 319 A.2d at 180 (disallowing a wrongful discharge claim despite 
the danger of allowing a possibly defective product to remain on the market); 
Rothstein, supra note 23, § 8.9 (citing Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 472 
(Md. 1981)) (“[R]ecognition of an otherwise undeclared public policy as a basis for a 
judicial decision involves the application of a very nebulous concept to the facts of a 
given case, and declaration of public policy is normally the function of the legislative 
branch.”). 
 111 See, e.g., Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 89 (declining to recognize a cause of action for 
wrongful discharge because public policy is more appropriately resolved by the 
legislature).  See also Geary, 319 A.2d at 180-81 (disallowing a wrongful discharge 
claim because it was not embodied in legislation or statute). 
 112 See, e.g., Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 89; see also Geary, 319 A.2d at 180. 
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the employment-at-will context. 
IV.  THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT: CARVING OUT A PUBLIC POLICY 
EXCEPTION 
Courts actively have carved out public policy exceptions in the 
employment context.113  Most notably, courts have created exceptions 
to the employment-at-will doctrine.114  Horace G. Wood is credited 
with formulating the employment-at-will doctrine,115 which provides 
that an employee hired for an indefinite term may be freely 
terminated for any reason or no reason at all.116  Grounded initially 
on “the concept of freedom of contract and a laissez-faire 
socioeconomic view,” the traditional rule gained acceptance towards 
the end of the nineteenth century.117  For many years, the courts 
continued to adhere to this approach, choosing not to interfere with 
the power of either party to freely terminate an employment 
contract.118 
Legislative developments in the beginning of the twentieth 
century, however, extended greater protections to employees.119  First, 
after the passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935,120 
collective bargaining agreements often contained “just cause” 
 
 113 See, e.g., Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 880-81; Peterman, 344 P.2d at 27-28.  See also 
Rothstein, supra note 23, § 8.9. 
 114 See supra note 113. 
 115 See generally HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 
(1877).  There is debate regarding whether Horace G. Wood actually invented the at-
will doctrine.  See Munoz v. Expedited Freight Sys., Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1181, 1185 
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (citing LEX K. LARSON, UNJUST DISMISSAL (1991)).  The six cases that 
Wood relied on when formulating the doctrine do not actually support the 
proposition.  Id. 
 116 See generally WOOD, supra note 115. 
 117 For example, in the seminal case of Henry v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad Co., 
a railroad employee challenged his dismissal, alleging that he was discharged 
“maliciously and without probable cause.”  21 A. 157, 157 (Md. 1891).  The court 
emphasized that the railroad was free to discharge an employee with or without 
cause in the absence of a contract to the contrary.  Id. at 158.  The court discounted 
the employee’s arguments concerning the unfairness of his dismissal and added that 
it could not see “that the questions of malice and want of probable cause have 
anything to do with the case.”  Id.; see also Reid Anthony Muoio, An Independent 
Auditor’s Suit for Wrongful Discharge, 58 ALB. L. REV. 413, 429 (1994) (discussing the 
development of an at-will employee’s right to sue for wrongful discharge). 
 118 See, e.g., Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 87; Geary, 319 A.2d at 180; see also Rothstein, 
supra note 23, § 8.1 (“For the first half of the twentieth century the employment at 
will rule was virtually unchallenged . . . .”). 
 119 Rothstein, supra note 23, § 8.1. 
 120 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988). 
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clauses.121  Second, the emergence of state and local civil service 
protection laws insulated even more workers from arbitrary 
discharge.122  Later, civil rights legislation re-enforced the principle 
that an employer’s discretion in hiring and firing must sometimes 
give way to societal interests.123 
Beginning in the latter half of the twentieth century, tort and 
contract theories gradually eroded the doctrine.124  Recognizing that 
the economic underpinnings of the at will doctrine had changed 
drastically,125 courts began to carve out an exception to the at-will 
employment relationship.126  Peterman v. International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters127 was “the first major judicial crack in the employment at 
will rule.”128  In Peterman, the court recognized a non-statutory cause 
of action based on public policy when a union local dismissed an 
 
 121 Rothstein, supra note 23, § 8.1. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 896 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Once the 
common-law cornerstone of employment relations not covered by either civil service 
laws or the National Labor Relations Act, the at-will doctrine has been significantly 
eroded by both tort and contract theories . . . .”).  The major contract theories that 
eroded the at-will doctrine are: “(1) breach of an express or implied promise, 
including representations made in employee handbooks; (2) discharge in violation 
of public policy; and (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.” Rothstein, supra note 23, § 8.1.  Courts also began to use torts such as 
“interference with economic advantage or contractual relations, fraud and 
misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, defamation, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress” in the employment context.  Id. 
 125 The Geary court explained that since the time of Henry, “huge corporate 
enterprises . . . have emerged . . . [that] wield an awesome power over their 
employees.”  Geary, 319 A.2d at 176.  In response to the emergence of huge 
corporate enterprises, F. Tannenbaum, in his treatise, A Philosophy of Labor, argued: 
we have become a nation of employees.  We are dependent upon 
others for our means of livelihood, and most of our people have 
become completely dependent upon wages.  If they lose their jobs they 
lose every resource, except for the relief supplied by the various forms 
of social security.  Such dependence of the mass of the people upon 
others for all of their income is something new in the world.  For our 
generation, the substance of life is in another man’s hands. 
Id. (quoting F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951)). 
 126 See, e.g., Geary, 319 A.2d at 176; Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 
425, 427-28 (Ind. 1973) (holding that plaintiff was retaliatorily discharged for filing a 
workers compensation claim); Monge v. Beeber Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 
1974) (holding that “[a] termination by the employer of a contract of employment at 
will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation . . . constitutes a 
breach of the employment contract”); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 515-16 (Or. 
1975) (holding that plaintiff was wrongfully discharged for serving jury duty); 
Peterman, 344 P.2d at 27-28. 
 127 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). 
 128 Rothstein, supra note 23, § 8.1. 
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agent for refusing to commit perjury.129  The court emphasized that 
the employer’s actions violated the clear public interest in 
encouraging truthful testimony.130 
Today, nearly every state recognizes the public policy exception 
to the employment-at-will rule in some form, whether at common law 
or by statute.131  Although each state implements the public policy 
exception differently, most cases involving the exception can be 
grouped into one of four broad, non-exclusive categories: (1) 
refusing to perform unlawful acts; (2) reporting illegal activity 
(whistleblowing); (3) exercising legal rights; and (4) performing 
public duties.132 
Despite recognizing a public policy exception to the 
employment-at-will rule, many courts still remain reluctant to restrain 
an employer’s broad discretion to fire in the absence of an explicit 
legislative declaration to the contrary.133  For example, the Murphy 
court declined to recognize the tort of abusive or wrongful discharge 
of an at-will employee because the “perception and declaration of 
relevant public policy . . . [was] . . . best and more appropriately 
 
 129 Peterman, 344 P.2d at 27-28; see also Muoio, supra note 117, at 429 (internal 
citation omitted). 
 130 Peterman, 344 P.2d at 27-28. 
 131 Rothstein, supra note 23, at 261-62.  Every state except Alabama, Florida, 
Georgia, Louisiana, New York, and Rhode Island recognize some type of public 
policy exception to the employment-at-will rule.  See id.; see also Muoio, supra note 
117, at 430.  A public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine has been 
recognized in the following circumstances: 
where an employee was fired for refusing to participate in an illegal 
price fixing scheme, for failing to vote stock in accordance with dictates 
of management, for refusing to “pack” insurance policies, for refusing 
to make a commercial bribe, for threatening to notify the Food and 
Drug Administration of an employer’s falsification of test results, for 
refusing to pump bilges in violation of federal law, for refusing to sign 
a false statement, for refusing to testify untruthfully in court, for 
refusing to alter state-required pollution control reports, for 
attempting to report a salesman’s improper conduct to the state 
insurance commission, for union membership and activity, and for 
filing a worker’s compensation claim, among others. 
Rothstein, supra note 23, at 261-62. 
 132 Rothstein, supra note 23, at 261-62.  For example, this Comment suggests that 
courts should question the enforceability of non-disclosure provisions involving 
medical care professionals.  See supra PART II (discussing Giannecchini, 780 A.2d 
1006). 
 133 See Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 89 (declining to recognize a wrongful discharge 
action in the absence of legislature guidance); see also Geary, 319 A.2d at 180 
(declining to recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge because of the 
importance of legislative or statutory guidance). 
 864 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:845 
resolved by the legislative branch.”134  Judges began to walk a 
metaphoric tight rope in order to avoid acting without the stamp of 
legislative approval.  Also, in Geary v. United States Steel Corp.,135 the 
plaintiff was fired for voicing his concerns about a product’s safety.136  
The court disallowed a cause of action for wrongful discharge despite 
its clear interest in protecting the public from the marketing of a 
possibly defective product.137  The majority reluctantly conceded that 
there may be situations where an employer’s discretion to discharge 
must be restrained in the face of public policy concerns, noting: 
[i]t may be granted that there are areas of an employee’s life in 
which his employer has no legitimate interest.  An intrusion into 
one of these areas by virtue of the employer’s power of discharge 
might plausibly give rise to a cause of action, particularly where 
some recognized facet of public policy is threatened.138 
The court explicitly asserted, however, the importance of a statutorily 
conferred right139 or “clear and compelling” mandate of public 
policy.140 
In light of this dilemma, the Geary court fashioned a narrow 
holding to avoid decisively resolving the case.141  The court stated that 
the plaintiff’s policy argument did not rise to the level of a “clear and 
compelling” mandate of public policy.142  The absence of a legislative 
mandate justified the court’s decision not to define the parameters of 
the employer’s privilege of hiring and firing employees.143 
The dissent attacked the majority’s reluctance to respond to the 
realities of the twentieth century144 and criticized the majority’s 
concerns about overburdening the courts with complex litigation 
 
 134 Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 89. 
 135 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974). 
 136 Id. at 175. 
 137 Id. at 181. 
 138 Id. at 185. 
 139 Id. at 180 (discussing Frampton, 297 N.E.2d at 427-28) (recognizing a non-
statutory cause of action for wrongful discharge when an employee was discharged 
because she filed a claim against her employer under Indiana’s workmen’s 
compensation statute). 
 140 Id. 
 141 Geary, 319 A.2d at 180.  The Geary court, despite recognizing that the plaintiff 
had sought to prevent the defendant from marketing a product that could be 
dangerous, inferred that the company must have dismissed plaintiff because he 
“made a nuisance of himself” and to preserve administrative order.  Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 183 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (discussing Lawrence E. Blades, Employment-
at-Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 
COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1418 (1967)). 
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“[as] nothing more than an unarticulated fear of the mythological 
Pandora’s box.”145  The dissent argued that the court should 
recognize that freedom of contract cannot insulate an employer’s 
arbitrary and abusive actions.146  In stressing the need for a case-by-
case analysis, Justice Roberts emphasized that a court is obligated to 
qualify even what appears to be an absolute right if it contravenes 
public policy.147  Justice Roberts then urged the court to “fulfill its 
societal role and its responsibility to the public interest by 
recognizing a cause of action for wrongful discharge.”148 
In sharp contrast to the timid views expressed by the Geary 
majority, the court in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.149 
articulated perhaps the most expansive view of public policy.150  In 
Palmateer, the plaintiff alleged that he had been fired because he 
supplied information to the authorities and agreed to cooperate in 
the investigation of an employee’s criminal activity.151  Acknowledging 
that the “Achilles heel” of retaliatory discharge cases is the lack of a 
precise definition of public policy, the court posited that public 
policy must be a matter that “strike[s] at the heart of a citizen’s social 
rights, duties, and responsibilities.”152  In concluding that a claim for 
retaliatory discharge existed, the court emphasized that public policy 
clearly favors reporting criminal offenses.153 
Interestingly, the dissent in Palmateer echoed the concerns of the 
Geary court.154  The dissent feared that the decision would upset the 
balance between employer and employee interests, forcing employers 
to defend all personnel decisions against claims for retaliatory 
discharge.155  The dissent then argued that because the concept of 
public policy is vague and uncertain, the judiciary should refrain 
from interfering with the discretion of an employer in the absence of 
a policy found in a legislative enactment.156  Despite conceding that 
the plaintiff’s conduct was at least commendable, the dissent 
emphasized that such a claim should not be sustained “ in the vague 
 
 145 Id. at 182 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 146 Id. at 185 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 147 Geary, 319 A.2d at 183 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 148 Id. at 185 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 149 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981). 
 150 Id. at 878-79. 
 151 Id. at 877. 
 152 Id. at 878-79. 
 153 Id. at 880. 
 154 Id. at 881 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
 155 Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 884-85 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
 156 Id. at 885 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
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belief that public policy requires that we all become ‘citizen crime-
fighters.’”157 
These cases illustrate the opposing judicial attitudes regarding 
the appropriate role of legislation in shaping public policy.158  As a 
result of these two distinct approaches, no consistent public policy 
doctrine has emerged.159  Yet, at least some courts have been willing 
to apply the public policy doctrine in the employment context, 
limiting what would otherwise be unlimited employer discretion to 
hire and fire employees.160 
Although the creation of a tort action in the employment 
context is not perfectly analogous to carving out a public policy 
defense to enforcement of a non-disclosure contract, in both contexts 
the courts must resolve the tension between their duty to protect the 
public and preserving the freedom of the parties.161  Whether the 
courts create an affirmative tort or allow a contract defense based on 
public policy, the courts are making a judgment that there is 
something problematic or unjust about enforcing a particular type of 
contract. 
In the employment context, the courts have made a 
determination that, despite principles of freedom of contract, the at-
will doctrine may offend public policy in certain instances.162  As a 
result, the courts, and ultimately the legislature, have chosen to 
undermine the at-will doctrine by carving out a public policy 
exception.163  This Comment suggests that courts should similarly 
recognize that the harm that confidential settlement contracts have 
on society clearly outweighs an individual’s privacy interests.  In 
addition, courts should recognize their broad discretion and duty to 
protect the public even in the absence of a statutorily conferred right 
or clear legislative declaration of the policy at stake.  Thus, courts 
should recognize public policy as an exception to the enforcement of 
non-disclosure provisions which may prove harmful to public welfare. 
 
 157 Id. at 881 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
 158 There are two distinct judicial attitudes towards articulating public policy.  The 
first is actively articulating public policy in response to social realities.  See Geary, 319 
A.2d at 180.  The second is declining to frame public policy in the absence of 
statutory or legislative guidance.  See Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 880; see also 1 W. STORY, 
supra note 62, § 675. 
 159 See supra note 158. 
 160 See, e.g., Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 880-81; Peterman, 344 P.2d 27-28. 
 161 See infra notes 192 & 214 and accompanying text. 
 162 See, e.g., Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 880-81; Peterman, 344 P.2d at 27-28.  See also 
Rothstein, supra note 23, § 8.9. 
 163 See supra note 162. 
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V.  WHISTLEBLOWING AS A MODEL 
Whistleblowing is one of the most common forms of the public 
policy exception.164  The whistleblower exception protects employees 
who are discharged for reporting illegal or harmful activity.165  
Employers’ increasing use of confidentiality agreements over the last 
ten years, however, undermines this protection; many recent cases 
involve confidentiality provisions that prohibit employees from 
blowing the whistle.166  As a result, these cases weigh contractual 
protections against the protections afforded by whistleblower 
statutes.167  This delicate balancing illustrates how courts should 
resolve the tension between the public’s interest in disclosure and 
private contractual interests in secrecy.  In addition, whistleblowing is 
a useful model because the federal government and all fifty state 
legislatures have enacted legislation in response to judicial 
 
 164 Rothstein, supra note 23, § 8.9. 
 165 Id. § 8.11. 
 166 See, e.g., Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556, 
563 (4th Cir. 1990).  In Sumitomo, the court laid out the following three-factor test for 
assessing the reasonableness of confidentiality provisions: 
1. Is the restraint on circumvention no broader than is necessary, from 
the standpoint of the trade secret holder, to protect the holder from 
the disclosure of its confidential information? 
2. From the standpoint of the party that received the confidential 
information, is the restraint reasonable in the sense that it is not 
unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing the legitimate efforts of that 
party to conduct its business? 
3. Is the restraint reasonable from the standpoint of sound public 
policy? 
Id.; see also Follmer, Rudzewicz & Co. v. Kosco, 362 N.W.2d 676, 683 (Mich. 1984) 
(holding that courts should enforce confidentiality provisions only to the extent 
reasonably necessary to protect the confidential information); Durham v. Stand-By 
Labor, Inc., 198 S.E.2d 145, 149-50 (Ga. 1973) (holding that courts should 
determine whether “the restraint [on disclosure] is reasonably related to the 
protection of information”); Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 34, at 152-53, stating: 
The use of secrecy clauses has been growing over the past ten years.  At 
the same time, there has been increased legislative and judicial activity 
encouraging employees to come forward and blow the whistle when 
the organizations for which they work engage in wrongdoing.  These 
trends to encourage and to thwart employee disclosures have led to 
conflicts . . . in which the courts are asked to determine the 
enforceability of whistleblowers’ confidentiality agreements.  At 
present, it is unclear under what circumstances, and to what extent, 
such provisions will be enforced. 
Id.; see also Bast, supra note 29, at 639-42 (discussing how some courts carefully 
scrutinize confidentiality agreements to ensure that protection is reasonable in light 
of the information that is being shielded and the public interest). 
 167 See, e.g., Sumitomo, 914 F.2d at 563; Follmer, 362 N.W.2d at 683; Durham, 198 
S.E.2d at 149-50.  See also Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 34, at 152-53. 
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recognition of the whistleblower exception.168 
A.  Whistleblower Legislation: Recommending Emphasis on Public 
Health and Safety 
Whistleblowing considerations played a role in the early judicial 
erosions of the employment-at-will doctrine.169  Widespread 
encouragement of whistleblowing in order to protect the public 
good, however, did not gain momentum until the 1980’s.170  Although 
the same general objectives underlie all whistleblowing protections, 
there is great inconsistency between the laws of each state and the 
corresponding judicial interpretations.171 
At the core of whistleblowing analysis is the conflict between the 
interests of the employer, the employee and society.172  Ultimately, 
whistleblowing endeavors to protect the public’s clear interest in 
exposing, deterring, and curtailing wrongdoing.173  Additionally, 
Professor Carol Bast suggests that whistleblower protection is also 
rooted in the basic moral principle that an employee has a right to 
blow the whistle when an organization engages in illegal or immoral 
conduct.174  These propositions, however, only represent a small 
 
 168 See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State 
Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 100 (2000).  For examples of statutory 
provisions, see Callahan & Dworkin, supra, at app. A (charting whistleblower 
protections in all fifty states); Schwab, supra note 28, at 1957-58.  Twenty-six states 
have continued to recognize a whistleblowing public policy exception at common-
law.  See Bast, supra note 29, at 627.  These twenty-six states are: 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Texas, Washington, and West Virginia. 
Id. 
 169 See, e.g., Peterman v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).  
See also supra note 26 and accompanying text; Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 168, at 
105-06. 
 170 Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 168, at 99. 
 171 Id. at 99-100.  Whistleblowing legislation, in general, follows one of two models: 
those using incentives to encourage whistleblowing and those seeking to protect 
against the retaliation of the employer.  Id. at 100.  Perhaps the most significant and 
effective of federal whistleblower legislation is the False Claims Act (FCA), which 
accomplishes its goals through a complex use of incentives.  Id. (discussing FALSE 
CLAIMS ACT, 31 U.S.C.S. § 231 (2003)) (revised § 3729).  Most state legislatures, 
however, have chosen to follow the anti-retaliation model, focusing instead on 
deterring and uncovering wrongful conduct.  Id. at 108-09. 
 172 Bast, supra note 29, at 660. 
 173 Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 168, at 100. 
 174 Bast, supra note 29, at 645 (discussing Nicholas M. Rongine, Toward a Coherent 
Legal Response to the Public Policy Dilemma Posed by Whistleblowing, 23 AM. BUS. L.J. 280, 
286 (1985)). 
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portion of the complex considerations surrounding whistleblowing.175 
On the one hand, whistleblowing can interfere with an 
employer’s traditional concerns for productivity, efficiency, and 
authority over his employees, and may create the danger of false 
negative publicity resulting from disclosures.176  Moreover, 
whistleblowing may obscure the employee’s inherent duties of 
obedience, loyalty, and confidentiality to his employer.177  On the 
other hand, whistleblower protection enhances the employee’s job 
security and expectations of fair treatment in the workplace.178  
Additionally, society can reap broad benefits from whistleblowing 
when it safeguards public health and safety and discourages improper 
or illegal conduct.179  If, however, employers act too cautiously in their 
hiring and firing practices because of whistleblower protections, it 
may harm the public by creating an incompetent workplace.180 
Interestingly, some courts only recognize the whistleblower 
exception when the employee reports violations affecting public 
health and safety.181  For example, although New York has yet to 
recognize a wrongful discharge action based on public policy,182 the 
legislature has adopted twelve whistleblower-related statutes 
emphasizing public health and safety.183  The statutory scheme 
requires the employee prove a clear connection between the conduct 
 
 175 Id. 
 176 See id. at 660-68. 
 177 See id. at 661, 663.  Employees’ recognition and understanding of whistleblower 
protections may cause them to dismiss the importance of their obligations to the 
employer, such as loyalty and obedience.  Id. 
 178 Id. at 666. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Bast is essentially arguing that whistleblower protections may 
disproportionately chill employers from discharging employees for legitimate 
reasons.  See Bast, supra note 29, at 665-66. 
 181 See, e.g., Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685, 690 (Kan. 1988) (holding that an 
employee must prove that a “a reasonably prudent person would have concluded the 
employee’s co-worker or employer was engaged in activities in violation of rules, 
regulations, or the law pertaining to public health, safety, and the general welfare”); 
Mitishen v. Falcone Piano Co., 630 N.E.2d 294, 295 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (holding 
that public policy exception did not apply because the unfair labor practices that the 
employee reported did not present a threat to public health and safety); Kraus v. 
New Rochelle Hosp. Med. Ctr., 216 A.D.2d 360 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). 
 182 See, e.g., Lobosco v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 751 N.E.2d 462, 464 (N.Y. 2001) (noting that 
New York does not recognize the tort of wrongful discharge); Murphy v. Am. Home 
Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 87 (N.Y. 1983) (declining to recognize a tort for abusive 
or wrongful discharge).  See also Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 168, at 115. 
 183 This statutory scheme creates a confusing array of standards regulating the 
relationship between employers and employees.  See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 
(McKinney 2003); N.Y. CIV. LAW § 75-b (McKinney 2003); N.Y.  LAB. LAW § 740 
(McKinney 2003) (covering whistleblowing involving certain health care workers). 
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reported and the promotion of health and safety concerns.184 
Although New York courts resist the public policy exception185 and 
the statutory scheme is complex,186 the emphasis on public welfare 
and safety provides a useful paradigm. 
Accordingly, the development of the whistleblower exception to 
at-will employment is evidence that courts can actively carve out 
public policy exceptions that effect a legislative response.187  In 
addition, tying the whistleblower exception to public health and 
safety limits its application to instances where disclosure will actually 
further a substantial public interest. 
B.  Whistleblowing and Confidentiality Agreements: A Delicate Balance 
As mentioned above, the whistleblowing analysis is complicated 
by employers’ increasing use of confidentiality agreements to protect 
information from public exposure.188  Like any other contract clause, 
however, a confidentiality agreement can be set aside based on public 
policy.189  Thus, despite the courts’ disinclination to interfere with 
private parties’ freedom to define the contours of their relationships, 
an employee who exposes an employer’s wrongful conduct in breach 
of a non-disclosure contract may still legitimately argue that societal 
 
 184 Kraus, 216 A.D.2d at 116-18.  For example, New York Labor Law Section 
740(2)(a), provides as follows: 
An employer shall not take any retaliatory personnel action against an 
employee because such employee does any of the following: 
(a) discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a 
public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer that is 
in violation of law, rule or regulation which violation creates and 
presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health or 
safety . . . . 
§ 740(2)(a).  An illustrative case is Kraus v. New Rochelle Hospital Medical Center, where 
the hospital vice-president of nursing was terminated for following standard 
procedure in reporting health violations; specifically, a doctor’s failure to properly 
document or get informed consent before performing bronchoscopies.  260 A.D.2d 
at 361.  In order to establish a violation under New York Labor Law Section 740, the 
nurse was required to prove that “the violation is one that creates and presents a 
substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety.”  Id. at 364 (quoting § 
740).  In holding that the nurse had presented sufficient evidence to proceed, the 
court emphasized that the doctor’s actions created a substantial and specific danger 
because the procedure “can result in death, cardiac arrest, and hemorrhage.”  Id. at 
365.  Contra Green v. Saratoga A.R.C., 233 A.D.2d 821 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); 
Connolly v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 161 A.D.2d (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
 185 See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 186 See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 187 See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 168, at 99-100 (discussing the emergence 
of whistleblower protection in all fifty states). 
 188 Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 34, at 152-53. 
 189 Id. at 162. 
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interests outweigh the employer’s interest in privacy.190 
Some commentators have attempted to reconcile the competing 
interests at stake and offer creative approaches for determining the 
enforceability of confidentiality agreements.191  For example, 
Professor Terry Morehead Dworkin analyzes the balancing approach 
of the Second Restatement in an attempt to determine definitively 
when the consequences of silence are too high.192  Professor Dworkin 
advocates the use of a two-tiered inquiry for evaluating the strength of 
a public policy.193  First, Professor Dworkin emphasizes that both a 
general analysis of public policies favoring whistleblowing and a 
broad examination of “specific evidence of societal repudiation” of 
the employer’s conduct are relevant in weighing the importance of 
the Restatement policies opposing enforcement.194  Second, Professor 
Dworkin suggests courts should void a contract when non-
enforcement will actually “impact” the policy at stake;195 that is, courts 
should choose non-enforcement when there is “a likelihood that a 
refusal to enforce the term will further that policy.”196  This approach 
recognizes, however, that the factors of the Restatement, despite their 
usefulness, are not dispositive.197  In essence, the core of the inquiry 
must be directed at curtailing and correcting misconduct while 
preserving the certainties of contract law and protecting the secrecy 
of legitimately confidential information.198 
 
 190 Id. at 161-62. 
 191 Id.; see also Bast, supra note 29. 
 192 Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 34, at 171. 
 193 Id. at 181.  The first tier, “clarity,” assesses the definiteness and weight of the 
policy at issue by first looking to the explicitness of the policy as articulated by the 
legislature or the courts, and then at its relative importance.  Id.  Dworkin argues that 
recent legislative and judicial positions unequivocally establish the importance of 
whistleblowing.  Id.  Thus, the considerations in favor of enforcement should be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis in light of societal disapproval of the wrongful 
conduct at issue.  Id. 
The second tier of the analysis, “impact,” is particularly relevant in employment-
at-will cases, and further explicates the Restatement inquiry into “the likelihood that 
a refusal to enforce the term will further that policy.”  Id. (citing RESTATEMENT § 179 
cmt. b.).  In assessing the impact of non-enforcement on the overall furtherance of 
the public good, Dworkin asserts that the most important considerations are the “job 
description of the whistleblower and the power to respond possessed by the party to 
whom the whistle is blown.”  Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 34, at 181-84. 
 194 Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 34, at 179. 
 195 Id. at 181-84; see also supra note 183 (discussing “impact”). 
 196 See RESTATEMENT § 179 cmt. b. 
 197 Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 34, at 187. 
 198 Bast notes: 
two lines of inquiry are most relevant to the decision whether a 
confidentiality promise should be enforced against a whistleblower in a 
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In contrast to Professor Dworkin’s emphasis on the balancing 
approach of the Restatement as a useful guide, Professor Carol M. 
Bast chooses a more ambitious route and proposes a new test for 
evaluating non-disclosure provisions.199  First, Professor Bast observes 
that one must begin with the premise that the agreement is generally 
enforceable but then asserts that public policy should reflect 
fundamental public values, regardless of whether it is reflected in 
legislation.200  Bast finds support for this proposition in the work of 
Professor Stewart J. Schwab.201  Professor Schwab criticizes the 
insistence on the part of many courts that a public policy exception 
must be grounded in positive law.202  He emphasizes that a demand 
that employees reference specific statutory violations “can lead to 
awkward or even tortured analysis” and “can sidetrack the case from 
the real issues.”203  Instead, Schwab argues, courts should focus on the 
effects of such conduct on third parties, and resolve the issues based 
on whether enforcement of the contract will have “substantial adverse 
third-party effects.”204 
Expanding Professor Schwab’s thesis, Bast argues that judicial 
reluctance to exercise discretion in the absence of positive law may be 
underinclusive where positive law does not suffice to protect against a 
substantial health or safety danger.205  Bast asserts that “in the 
hierarchy of public policies, safety from physical harm and death 
ranks at or near the top.”206  The possible safety risks of enforcement, 
however, may sometimes be too remote or speculative to justify non-
 
particular case. Both address the conflict between societal interests in 
reducing and deterring organizational misconduct, on one hand, and 
in contract enforcement, on the other.  The essence of this 
accommodation is to curtail and correct misconduct while minimizing 
the disclosure of legitimately confidential information. 
Bast, supra note 29, at 708. 
 199 Id. at 708; see also supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 200 Bast, supra note 29, at 700-01. 
 201 Schwab, supra note 28; see also Bast, supra note 29, at 707 (discussing Schwab). 
 202 Positive law is statutes, legislation, and judicial decisions.  Schwab, supra note 
28, at 1958. 
 203 Id. at 1959.  Schwab relies on Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., to 
demonstrate this point.  Id. (discussing Wagenseller, 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985)).  In 
Wagenseller, a nurse was fired for refusing to participate in a skit that involved 
mooning the audience.  710 P.2d at 1029.  The court insisted on determining 
whether there was a statutory violation, and ultimately had to determine whether 
mooning violated an Arizona statute against indecent exposure of the anus or 
genitals.  Id. at 1035 n.5.   
 204 Schwab, supra note 28, at 1958. 
 205 Bast, supra note 29, at 706. 
 206 Id. at 707. 
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enforcement.207  Thus, courts should only invalidate confidentiality 
agreements when they present a substantial and imminent threat to 
public health and safety.208 
In her conclusion, Professor Bast proposes a six-part test for 
determining whether confidentiality agreements should be 
enforced.209  The test seeks to balance the employer’s interest in 
secrecy against the employee’s and society’s interests in disclosure.210  
To determine whether a confidentiality agreement should be 
enforced, a court should examine the following six factors: 
1.  what information the parties reasonably expected to be 
protected under the confidentiality agreement (reasonable 
expectations); 
2.  any loss to the employer that would result if enforcement were 
denied (loss to the employer); 
3.  the extent to which the information is protectable as a trade 
secret or proprietary information (protectability); 
4.  any substantial adverse third party effect enforcement of the 
term would have on third parties (substantial adverse effect on 
third parties); 
5.  the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will contribute 
to the effect (exacerbation of adverse effect); 
6.  whether limited disclosure would guard against the effect while 
still protecting employer’s information (limited disclosure).211 
Thus, Bast elucidates a test that provides the judiciary with greater 
flexibility in a framework of guided discretion.212  Most significant to 
the analysis is Bast’s recognition of the significance of third party 
effects, especially health and public safety.213 
In sum, that many courts continue to protect whistleblowers 
despite the existence of confidentiality agreements suggests that 
courts are capable of qualifying private contractual guarantees in 
light of a clear, countervailing public policy.214  Some courts, however, 
 
 207 Id. at 705-06 (“Health and safety threats should certainly be disclosed where 
the danger is substantial and imminent.”). 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. at 709. 
 210 Id. at 708. 
 211 Bast, supra note 29, at 709. 
 212 Id. at 703-04. 
 213 Id. at 706-07. 
 214 See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 34, at 152-53; see also Bast, supra note 29, at 
639-42 (discussing how some courts carefully scrutinize confidentiality agreements to 
ensure that protection is reasonable in light of the information that is being shielded 
and the public interest). 
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continue to exercise a stubborn reluctance to act in the absence of a 
clear legislative articulation.215  Commentators have posited other 
considerations and even advanced new tests of enforceability that are 
useful in attempting to resolve the court’s conundrum.216  Ultimately, 
however, courts must strike a balance that protects public health and 
safety and yet does not trample parties’ legitimate interests in 
confidentiality.217 
VI.  ESTABLISHING A ZONE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
It is clear that the pervasive judicial reluctance to act in the 
absence of a clear legislative articulation forces courts to indulge in 
constrained reasoning.218  Despite the majoritarian principle that the 
legislature is in a superior position to perceive the general needs of 
the public in a representative society, judicial activism can stimulate 
democracy in appropriate instances by responding to public concern 
and inducing the legislature to act.219  Although the judiciary should 
not be vested with the same unsupervised power it possessed before 
the evolution of the modern statutory regime,220 judges must strive to 
adopt a more active role in shaping public policy, especially when 
 
 215 See, e.g., Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983) 
(declining to recognize a claim for wrongful discharge because the legislature had 
not yet done so); Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974) (disallowing a 
wrongful discharge action, and asserting the importance of legislative or statutory 
guidance).  See also Schwab, supra note 28, at 1958 (discussing judicial reluctance to 
act in the absence of positive law). 
 216 See Bast, supra note 29, at 708; see also Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 34, at 
181; Schwab, supra note 28, at 1958. 
 217 Bast, supra note 29, at 708; see also supra note 198. 
 218 See, e.g., Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 89; Geary, 319 A.2d at 180.  See also Schwab, supra 
note 28, at 1958 (discussing how statutory reliance can result in awkward results); 
Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 684 (arguing that reliance on statutes can result in 
illogical results). 
 219 See ALDISERT, supra note 105, at 178.  Judge Aldisert argues that, although it 
might seem antidemocratic, putting lawmaking power in the hands of judges is not 
necessarily inconsistent with democracy because they are not creating final rules.  Id.  
Judges merely create starting points “that are subject to legislative revisions and 
about allocating the burden of inertia.”  Id.; see also Alan B. Handler, Judicial 
Jurisprudence, N.J. LAW., Oct. 2000, at 22 (“Even a court’s provisional answer to social 
problems can be a part of a dynamic by which policy is forged and law, as an 
expression of public policy and social authority, evolves and progresses.”); Michael 
Heise, Preliminary Thoughts on the Virtues of Passive Dialogue, 34 AKRON L. REV. 73 
(2000); Erin Rahne Kidwell, The Paths of the Law: Historical Consciousness, Creative 
Democracy, and Judicial Review, 62 ALB. L. REV. 91 (1998). 
 220 See 1 W. STORY, supra note 62, at 675; see also Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 679 
(arguing that with the birth of the modern regulatory regime the legislature replaced 
the judiciary as the dictator of public policy). 
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public danger is evident.221 
The sexual abuse scandal within the Catholic Church highlights 
the problems that arise when courts enforce contracts without 
considering the public welfare.222  Courts must recognize their duty to 
scrutinize any agreement that would sacrifice safety in favor of 
secrecy.223  For example, the non-disclosure agreements used in 
Giannecchini224 and in Catholic Church settlements225 pose obvious 
dangers to public health and safety by depriving society of vital 
information.  The difficulty is striking the proper balance between 
contractual guarantees and the public’s right to know.226 
In fashioning a new approach, the analysis in Giannecchini 
provides a good reference point.227  Aware of the danger to the public 
in enforcing a provision that would protect a medical professional’s 
record of poor performance, the Giannecchini court did not 
 
 221 Several recent cases indicate a growing judicial disinclination to enforce 
confidentiality agreements that present a substantial likelihood of public harm.  See, 
e.g., EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 512 (D. Mass.), modified, 94 F.3d 738 (1st 
Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Rush Prudential Health Plans, No. 97 C 3823, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4170, at *8-12 (E.D. Ill. April 1, 1998) (voiding a confidentiality clause that 
prohibited disclosure of the amount of settlement).  See also Dworkin & Callahan, 
supra note 34, at 163.  For example, in EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 512 (D. 
Mass.), modified, 94 F.3d 738 (1st Cir. 1996), the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission sought to prevent enforcement of confidentiality agreements that 
prohibited current and former Astra employees from cooperating in an investigation 
of wrongful conduct.  Id.  The fact that a government agency was the party seeking 
relief is significant, but the court’s reasoning is still quite relevant.  Id.  In granting 
the injunction against enforcement of the agreements, the court stressed that “a 
promise is unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed in the 
circumstances by a public policy harmed by the enforcement of the agreement.”  Id. 
at 518 (quoting Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). 
 222 See Goodstein, supra note 1 (discussing how confidential settlements allows 
pedophile priests to remain anonymous); see also Robinson, supra note 7 (discussing 
Judge McWeeny’s decision to unseal documents relating to sexual abuse of minors by 
priests); Ranalli, supra note 1 (discussing sexual abuse suits against former priest 
John Geoghan). 
 223 See generally Bast, supra note 29 (arguing that courts should focus on public 
health and safety when evaluating non-disclosure provisions). 
 224 Giannecchini v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 780 A.2d 1006, 1010 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
2000) (discussing that allowing medical professionals to shield records of their poor 
job performance through the use of non-disclosure agreements may lead to 
unreliable medical care). 
 225 See, e.g., Ranalli, supra note 1 (discussing the use of confidentiality agreements 
in connection with twenty-four cases of sexual abuse brought against former priest 
John Geoghan); Charter, supra note 6, at Preamble (“In the past, secrecy has created 
an atmosphere that has inhibited the healing process and, in some cases, enabled 
sexually abusive behavior to be repeated.”). 
 226 Bast, supra note 29, at 708. 
 227 Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1010-13. 
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reflexively enforce the contract.228  Instead, the court went one step 
further and referenced the relevant statutory provisions regarding 
disclosure of employee personnel records.229  Both parties argued that 
the legislature had explicitly contemplated the protection of an 
employee’s personnel records by a non-disclosure contract.230  
Although it is arguable whether Connecticut law clearly answered the 
question, the court’s careful consideration of public safety and its 
thorough examination of the relevant statutes provide a useful 
paradigm for evaluating non-disclosure provisions.231 
Courts must begin with a few necessary concessions to the law’s 
interests in certainty and predictability.  First, as Professor Bast 
acknowledged, the courts must start with the general proposition that 
the agreement is enforceable.232  Second, as Walter Gellhorn asserted, 
courts should reference any relevant legislation as the “starting point” 
of any inquiry into uncharted territory.233  Finally, as the drafters of 
the Second Restatement have suggested, judges should utilize 
legislation to enhance their understanding of the policy at stake.234  
Unless it clearly dictates a particular result, however, legislation 
should only be a judicial guidepost—one factor considered in the 
analysis.235  Judges must have discretion to void a contract that is 
injurious to fundamental public interests, even if legislation does not 
reflect an applicable policy.236 
The issue then is how courts should utilize relevant legislation 
when evaluating a non-disclosure contract.  Federal preemption 
doctrine provides a sound theoretical approach to determining the 
effect legislation should have on the analysis.237  Under federal 
preemption analysis, courts determine whether a federal regulation 
 
 228 See id. at 1011. 
 229 Id. (discussing CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-128e, f (2001)); see supra notes 49-54 
and accompanying text. 
 230 Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1011; see also supra notes 46 & 54 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Giannecchini court’s conclusion that the Connecticut legislature 
had explicitly considered all issues regarding disclosure of employee personnel 
records). 
 231 Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1011. 
 232 Bast, supra note 29, at 700. 
 233 Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 685. 
 234 RESTATEMENT §179 cmt. b. 
 235 Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 685. 
 236 Bast, supra note 29, at 706 (arguing that positive law may be underinclusive 
when it fails to protect against substantial health and safety dangers). 
 237 See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and 
Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983) (discussing federal preemption analysis).  See 
also Hoke, supra note 26, at 699-700 (laying out the three categories of federal 
preemption). 
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or legislative scheme displaces a state constitutional or statutory 
remedy.238  Federal preemption can be used as a defense when a 
federal law bars compliance with, or relief on the basis of, a state or 
local law.239  Thus, in determining whether to enforce a non-
disclosure contract, courts should first look to the relevant state 
and/or federal statutory provisions to determine if the regulatory 
scheme in effect “preempts” an independent discretionary judgment 
that a contract is unenforceable as contrary to public policy. 
Preemption analysis generally divides into three categories: 
express preemption, implied field preemption, and conflict 
preemption.240  The court, focusing on the plain meaning of the 
statutory language, will find express preemption when a federal 
statute clearly and explicitly preempts state law.241  When there is no 
express preemption provision, the court looks to whether the federal 
statute impliedly preempts the state law.242  Implied field preemption 
occurs when a federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive as to displace 
all state regulation.243  Conflict preemption occurs when state and 
federal law are inconsistent, thus rendering compliance with both an 
impossibility.244 
Ultimately, preemption analysis determines whether Congress 
intended to supersede state law.245  In order to ensure that 
congressional intent is clear, courts employ the “clear statement” 
rule.246  The “clear statement” rule ensures that “the legislature has in 
 
 238 See Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 203; see also Hoke, supra note 26, at 699-700. 
 239 See Hoke, supra note 26, at 691. 
 240 Betsey J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort 
Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 566 (1997). 
 241 Id.  For example, in Jones v. Rath Packing Co., the Supreme Court held that the 
Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), 21 U.S.C.S. § 606 (2003), preempted a state law 
allowing deviations from weights stated on meat packaging.  430 U.S. 519 (1977).  
Specifically, Section 678 of the FMIA expressly prohibits “[m]arking labeling, 
packaging, or ingredient requirements in addition to, or different than, those made 
under” the Act.  Jones, 430 U.S. at 530 (citing 21 U.S.C.S. § 678 (2003)); see also THE 
LAW OF PREEMPTION 16 n.60 (Appellate Judges Conference, American Bar Association 
eds., 1991) (“Other well-known preemption provisions are found in the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982), the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1982), and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1988).”). 
 242 Grey, supra note 240, at 566. 
 243 Id.  See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (holding that 
the United States Warehouse Act preempted state law by occupying the field because 
not only did it make federal law paramount over state law in event of conflict but it 
also terminated the dual system of regulation). 
 244 Grey, supra note 240, at 566. 
 245 Id. at 564. 
 246 Id. at 609. 
 878 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:845 
fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters 
involved in the decision.”247  Courts begin with the assumption that 
federal regulation does not supersede the states’ police powers unless 
Congress’ intent is absolutely clear.248  In the absence of preemption, 
states retain the Tenth Amendment right to protect the safety and 
welfare of its citizenry.249 
Using federal preemption analysis as a guide, courts should first 
determine if a statute expressly dictates a particular result and, if so, 
apply the statute.250  If there is no clear legislative articulation of the 
policy at stake, courts should next determine whether there is field 
preemption; that is, whether the relevant statutory scheme is so 
pervasive that it dictates a particular result.251  The ultimate goal of 
referencing statutes should be to determine whether the legislature 
has already considered and made a clear determination of the 
competing policy interests at stake.252  If it has, the court is bound to 
adhere to that judgment. 
If the legislature is silent on the issue or has not clearly 
elucidated a relevant policy, however, courts should have broad 
discretion to balance the equities in favor of and against 
enforcement.  Judges should begin with the general assumption that, 
in the absence of a clear expression of statutory intent, they retain 
the discretion to void a contractual provision that offends public 
policy.  Essentially, the absence of a definitive legislative articulation 
creates a zone of judicial discretion.253  Judges should not ignore their 
duty to the public and decline to act because the legislature has not 
provided an answer.  When the legislature has not clearly spoken, the 
 
 247 Id. at 610. 
 248 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 242 (1998) [hereinafter 16A AM. JUR.].  
For example, in P.R. Dep’t. of Consumer Affairs v. ISLA Petroleum Corp., the Supreme 
Court held, which although ISLA presented fragments of legislative history that 
supported their assertion that the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act preempted 
Puerto Rico’s regulation of gasoline prices, the statutory language was not sufficiently 
clear to support a finding of preemption.  485 U.S. 495, 501-03 (1988).  The 
Supreme Court emphasized that congressional intent could not be ascertained by 
viewing legislative history in a vacuum, without referencing statutory text “to which 
expressions of preemptive intent in legislative history might attach.”  Id.; see also THE 
LAW OF PREEMPTION, supra note 240, at 17-18 (discussing P.R. Dep’t. of Consumer 
Affairs, 485 U.S. 495). 
 249 16A AM. JUR., supra note 248, at 142. 
 250 See supra note 246 & 247 and accompanying text. 
 251 Grey, supra note 240, at 566.  Conflict preemption is clearly inapplicable 
because its application is limited to statutory conflict.  Id. 
 252 Id. 
 253 See Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 685 (“Public policies may well be served by the 
existence of a twilight zone in which steps are taken but cautiously.”). 
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courts should speak as the voice of the public. 
In the absence of statutory “preemption,” the courts’ main 
inquiry should be whether the agreement before them creates a 
substantial health or safety danger which outweighs enforcement, 
similar to the approach taken by the New York courts.254  As Professor 
Bast notes, the significance of the public policy behind protecting the 
public from physical harm and death is paramount.255  Following the 
suggestions of Professor Schwab, the court should focus its inquiry on 
the potential adverse third-party effects of the agreement.256  
Ultimately, even if the potential harms are speculative, the manifest 
importance of safeguarding the public from harm must supersede 
any private interests at stake.257  The courts are best equipped to 
decide when the causal connections between non-disclosure and 
public harm become too attenuated to interfere with enforcement of 
a contract.258 
As illustrated by the overwhelming response of all state 
legislatures in the whistleblowing context, the courts have the power 
to respond to modern realities and provide the impetus for effective 
legislative response.259  A judicial policy of deference to the legislature 
perpetuates a cycle of inaction—the courts refuse to act, defer to the 
legislature, and then the legislature declines the invitation to act.260  
Judicial activism in this area will re-enforce democracy because it will 
force the legislature either to remain silent or to speak clearly on 
policy questions before them.261  The judiciary must force the 
legislature to act by making a clear statement that contractual secrecy 
is not absolute when public safety is at stake. 
 
 
 
 254 See, e.g., Kraus v. New Rochelle Hosp. Med. Ctr., 216 A.D.2d 360 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1995) (discussing New York’s whistleblowing statutory scheme’s emphasis on 
public health and safety).  See also Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 168, at 116-18. 
 255 Bast, supra note 29, at 707. 
 256 Schwab, supra note 28, at 1958 (asserting that courts should focus on whether 
enforcement of a non-disclosure contract will have adverse third party effects). 
 257 See Bast, supra note 29, at 706 (arguing that “[b]ecause of the importance of 
health and safety, perhaps disclosure should be allowed where the danger is not 
quite so substantial or so imminent”). 
 258 Id. 
 259 See generally Callahan, supra note 168, 99-100 (discussing the emergence of 
whistleblower legislation in all fifty states). 
 260 See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 261 Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
There has never been a better time for brave judges to 
acknowledge the societal risks involved in enforcing confidential 
settlement contracts.262  The sexual abuse scandal in the Catholic 
Church has exposed the severe consequences of allowing parties to 
use confidentiality contracts to silence abuse victims at the expense of 
the public.263  The danger of routine enforcement of confidentiality 
contracts, however, is much more pervasive and extends beyond this 
single scandal.  Judges must strive to adopt a more active role in 
crafting broad social policy by refusing to enforce non-disclosure 
contracts that threaten public welfare, even in the absence of an 
authoritative legislative declaration.  In the absence of a clear 
expression of legislative intent, courts should be vested with broad 
discretion to balance contractual guarantees and public welfare.  
When public health and safety is at stake, a contract should never 
outweigh the public’s right to know. 
 
 262 See Robinson, supra note 7 (discussing Judge McWeeny’s decision to unseal 
documents concealing sexual abuse by priests). 
 263 See Goodstein, supra note 1; see also Grossman, supra note 8; Robinson, supra 
note 7. 
